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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") appeals from 
a final judgment of the Third District Court suspending Joseph P. Barrett from the 
practice of law in Utah for violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The 
Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Constitution 
article VIII, section 4, which provides that, "the Supreme Court by rule shall govern 
the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to practice law." 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
ISSUE I: Did the trial court err in ordering a suspension, rather than disbarment, 
for an attorney found to have engaged in intentional misappropriation of firm funds? 
This issue was preserved through closing argument and through the 
Sanctions Hearing Brief submitted to the District Court. [R. 399) 
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
While this Court will ordinarily presume the district court's findings to be 
correct, it "reserves the right to draw inferences from basic facts which may differ 
from the inferences drawn by the lower tribunal." In re Jardine, 2012 UT 67 1J 26. 
The standard of review for sanctions imposed for ·· pr.ofessional misconduct in 
attorney discipline actions is a correctness standard, but the Utah Supreme Court 
may make an independent judgment regarding the appropriate level of discipline 
if the evidence warrants it. See In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). 
I 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following rules are fully set forth in the Addendum to Brief of 
Appellant, submitted herewith: 






Purpose and Nature of Sanctions 
Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
Imposition of Sanctions 
Aggravation and Mitigation 
Rules of Professional Conduct (with comments) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This is an attorney discipline case. The district 
court suspended Mr. Barrett for a period of 150 days for violating rule 8.4(c) of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct in three separate matters. The OPC appeals the 
district court's decision and urges the Court, pursuant to its inherent authority to 
govern the practice of law, to impose the more appropriate sanction of disbarment. 
The Course of Proceedings: The OPC filed a Complaint against Mr. 
Barrett pursuant to a directive of a screening panel of the Utah Supreme Court's 
Ethics and Discipline Committee. [R. 1] On January 27, 2015, the district court 
presided over an adjudication trial to determine whether Mr. Barrett violated the 
Rules of Professional Conduct ("Rules"). [R. 321] On February 11, 2015, the court 
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issues its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, finding that Mr. Barrett violated 
rule 8.4(c) of the Rules. (R. 365) Accordingly, a sanctions hearing was held on 
March 2, 2015. [R. 426] On March 3, 2015, the court entered its order 
suspending Mr. Barrett for 150 days. [R. 429] The OPC filed its Notice of Appeal 
on March 5, 2015. [R. 484] 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Mr. Barrett was employed at the firm of Snow, Christensen and Martineau 
("the Firm") from 2003 until February 2012. [R. 366] 
Williams' Matter: 
In July 2007, the Firm and Mr. Barrett were hired by Dick Williams to 
represent Mr. Williams' son in a criminal matter. (R. 367) Mr. Williams paid a 
$1 ,000 retainer to the firm. The criminal matter was closed in December 2007 
without Mr. Barrett billing any time against the retainer. (R. 367) In 2008, Mr. 
Williams asked Mr. Barrett to assist him in a collections matter for his company, 
Dick's Backhoe and Sewer. Between April 2008 and September 2008, three 
charges totaling $460 where charged to Mr. Williams' account, but not billed 
against the retainer at that time. (R. 367) In the summer of 2008, Mr. Williams 
performed construction work at Mr. Barrett's personal residence. (R. 367) In 
August and September of 2008, Mr. Barrett requested all of the charges on Mr. 
Williams' account to be written off by the Firm. (R. 367) 
3 
In February 2010, Mr. Williams' son was charged in several new criminal 
matters. (R. 367) Mr. Williams contacted Mr. Barrett about representing him, and 
Mr. Barrett entered his appearance in the cases. (R. 368) Mr. Williams retained 
the Firm to represent his son. (R. 369) In March 2010, Mr. Williams paid $300 to 
the Firm. (R. 368) At some point, Mr. Williams and Mr. Barrett reached an 
agreement whereby Mr. Barrett would provide legal services to Mr. Williams' son in 
exchange for construction work performed by Mr. Williams at Mr. Barrett's personal 
residence. (R. 369) The Firm was unaware of the agreement. (R. 369) Between 
March 2010 and July 2010, Mr. Barrett billed $7,665 to Mr. Williams' account. 
Around June or July 2010, Mr. Williams provided construction services to Mr. 
Barrett at his personal residence in the form of a wrought iron railing . (R. 368) 
Between June 14 and June 25, Mr. Barrett requested that the firm write off a total of 
$7,446.57 in fees, costs, and interest from Mr. Williams' account. (R. 368) 
Mr. Williams was unable to compete the railing project at Mr. Barrett's home. 
(R. 368) The value of the construction services provided by Mr. Williams up to that 
point did not equal the value of the legal services provided by Mr. Barrett. (R. 369) 
So, on July 21, 2010, Mr. Williams, or his wife, wrote a check for $3,500 made out 
to Mr. Barrett personally, which represented the difference between the value of the 
legal services and the value of the construction work. (R. 370) Mr. Barrett 
deposited the check into his personal account. (R. 368) The Firm was unaware 
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that Mr. Williams paid $3,500 directly to Mr. Barrett for legal services. (R. 368) In 
2011, Mr. Barrett billed $400 to Mr. Williams' account, which was billed against the 
$1,000 retainer that had been paid in 2007. In April 2012, after Mr. Barrett left the 
Firm, the Firm refunded the remaining $600 of the retainer. (R. 368). Of the 
$8,612.07 billed to Mr. Williams' account, he only paid the Firm $700. Mr. Barrett 
requested that the remaining $7,912.07 be written off. (R. 369) 
Petersen Matter: 
Mr. Petersen was an owner of D& T Landscaping ("D& T"). Between 2006 
and 2009, D&T provided various landscaping services to Mr. Barrett at his personal 
residence, for which Mr. Barrett paid the company. (R. 370) In November 2010, 
Mr. Petersen retained the Firm and Mr. Barrett to represent him in a custody 
modification matter. (R. 370) Mr. Barrett and Mr. Petersen reached an agreement 
whereby Mr. Barrett would provide legal services in exchange for Mr. Petersen 
building a shed at Mr. Barrett's personal residence. (R. 372) The Firm was 
unaware of the agreement between Mr. Barrett and Mr. Petersen. (R. ·373) On 
November 2, 2010, Mr. Petersen paid a $2,500 retainer to the Firm. (R. 370) Mr. 
Barrett and Mr. Petersen had an agreement that Mr. Petersen would pay the 
$2,500 up front, but Mr. . Barrett would have the Firm refund it later. (R. 372) 
Between November 2010 and August 2011, the Firm billed $8,801.10 in fees, costs 
and interest to Mr. Petersen 's account. (R. 370) Mr. Petersen received regular 
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bills from the Firm but did not pay them because Mr. Barrett told him not to worry 
about them. (R. 373) Mr. Barrett concluded Mr. Petersen's custody case on or 
about July 20, 2011, and Mr. Petersen began construction on Mr. Barrett's shed on 
August 9, 2011. (R. 371) On August 25, 2011, Mr. Barrett requested that the Firm 
write off approximately half of Mr. Petersen's bill. (R. 371) On September 20, 
2011 , Mr. Barrett requested that the Firm write off half the remaining balance on 
Mr. Petersen's bill. (R. 371) On November 22, 2011, Mr. Barrett requested that the 
Firm write off the remaining balance on Mr. Petersen's bill. (R. 371) In total, Mr. 
Barrett requested that the Firm write off $8,913.54 in fees, costs and interest from 
Mr. Petersen's account. (R. 371) Mr. Petersen finished Mr. Barrett's shed by 
December 2011, and on December 13, 2011, Mr. Barrett requested that the Firm 
refund the $2,500 retainer, which it did. (R. 371) Mr. Petersen did not pay the Firm 
for any of the legal services provided. (R. 371) Mr. Barrett paid approximately 
$5,000 for the shed, which cost Mr. Petersen $15,170.63 to build. (R. 373) 
In February 2012, after the Firm became concerned about Mr. Barrett 
seeking reimbursement for questionable business expenses, Mr. Barrett was 
confronted by the Firm and his employment with the Firm ended. (R. 373) 
Based on the above facts, the trial court concluded that Mr. Barrett violated 
rule 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct by misappropriating $3,500 of firm 
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funds in the Williams matter, and by engaging in conduct involving dishonesty and 
deceit in both the Williams and Petersen matters.1 
ADDENDUM 
The following documents are attached as Addenda to this Brief: 
• Findings of Fact ar:id Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
• Order of Suspension. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Intentional misappropriation is indefensible, regardless of whether the victim 
is a client of the attorney's or the partners in his firm. Stealing is no less wrong , 
simply because it does not involve client funds. 
Mr. Barrett intentionally stole firm funds when he reached secret agreements 
with clients of the Firm to provide legal services in exchange for construction work 
to be performed by the clients at his personal residence. 
The same standard this Court applies to the intentional misappropriation of 
client funds should be applied to the intentional misappropriation of firm funds. 
Disbarment should be the presumptive sanction, regardless of the victim. 
1 The trial court also found that Mr. Barrett violated rule 8.4(c) by engaging in 
conduct involving dishonesty and deceit in another matter related to 
reimbursement for business expenses (the "California Matter"), but because the 
Williams and Petersen matters warrant disbarment on their own, it is not 
necessary to brief issues related to this third charge of misconduct. 
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In the present case, the mitigating factors are not truly compelling, and 
therefore, do not justify a departure from the presumptive sanction. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Stealing From One's Firm Is No Different Than Stealing From A 
Client. 
Although this Court has not addressed the issue of an attorney stealing 
from his or her own firm, other jurisdictions have. The Supreme Court of New 
Jersey stated: 
We see no ethical distinction between a lawyer who for 
personal gain willfully defrauds a client and one who for the 
same untoward purpose defrauds his or her partners. 
In the Matter of Siegel, 627 A.2d. 156, 159 (N.J. 1993) 
In Siegel , the attorney was disbarred after submitting false expense reports to 
his firm and withdrawing firm funds claiming it was a gift from the client. The 
Siegel court went on to explain the rationale for placing theft from a firm on the 
same level as theft from a client: 
(lg.) 
[A]lthough the relationship between lawyers and clients differs 
from that between partners, misappropriation from the latter is as 
wrong as from the former. A plainly-wrong act is not immunized 
because the victims are one's partners. 
In, In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Yajko, 674 N.E. 2d 684, 687 (Ohio 
1997), an attorney was disbarred after accepting payments from clients but only 
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depositing a portion of the funds into the firm's trust account, then keeping the 
balance and preparing false receipts and altering accounting records. The Ohio 
court adopted the following principle: 
It should matter little whether the theft or misappropriation is 
from an attorney's partners, associates, clients, family or 
friend; or whether the thefts were committed brazenly or 
deceptively, or whether tens of thousands of dollars or a 
relatively small amount was misappropriated. 
Other courts have also concluded that stealing from a firm is no different 
than stealing from a client. See, Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. 
Nothstein, 480 A.2d. 807 (Md. 1984); In re Salinger, 88 A.D.2d 133 (N.Y.S.2d 
1982); In re Seldon, 728 P.2d 1036 (Wash. 1986). 
This Court should hold that an attorney engages in misappropriation when 
he takes money that belongs to his firm or partners. This Court should further 
hold that an attorney engages in misappropriation when, without the knowledge 
of his firm or partners, he personally accepts services or property from a client in 
exchange for legal services performed by the firm for the client. 
In this case, Mr. Barrett engaged in misappropriation when he accepted 
$3,500 from Mr. Williams that belonged to the Firm and deposited it into his 
personal account. He further engag.ed in misappropriation when he provided 
legal services for Mr. Williams and Mr. Petersen in exchange for construction 
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work at his personal residence. It was the Firm, not Mr. Barrett, that was entitled 
to the value of the work performed by Mr. Williams and Mr. Petersen. 
II. Mr. Barrett Intentionally Misappropriated Firm Funds. 
Rule 14-601 ( e) defines "intent" as, "the conscious objective or purpose to 
accomplish a particular result." The evidence found by the trial court establishes 
that Mr. Barrett engaged in an intentional and calculated plan to misappropriate 
funds belonging to the Firm. 
When Mr. Williams retained Mr. Barrett to represent his son, Mr. Barrett 
tracked the work performed on the case, which resulted in bills being generated by 
the Firm. (See, Trial Exhibit #11 - Open Invoice, attached hereto as Exhibit 1) The 
trial court found that, in total, Mr. Barrett billed $8,612.07 to Mr. Williams' account. 
(R. 369). However, Mr. Williams only paid $700 to the Firm because Mr. Barrett 
caused the remaining $7,912.07 to be written-off. As a member of a firm 
committee dealing with such policies, Mr. Barrett was aware of the Firm's 
requirement that write-offs exceeding $4,000 be approved by the Firm's Executive 
Committee. (R. 375) Therefore, rather than write-off Mr. William's entire bill all at 
once, Mr. Barrett requested separate, smaller write-offs over several months, thus 
avoiding any firm oversight that would expose his plan. This conduct evidences a 
conscious objective to keep for himself the value of the construction work 
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performed by Mr. Williams in exchange for the legal services provided by the Firm 
through Mr. Barrett. 
Mr. Barrett engaged in the same scheme with regard to the legal services 
provided to Mr. Petersen. Although Mr. Barrett's work generated $8,801.10 in fees, 
costs, and interest billed to Mr. Petersen's account, which in turn resulted in 
monthly bills sent to the client, the Firm did not receive any payments from Mr. 
Petersen. That is because Mr. Barrett, again avoiding the threshold limit that would 
trigger any review by the Firm's Executive Committee, wrote-off Mr. Petersen's bill 
over a period of several months. (R. 371) Then, when the shed was finally 
completed in Mr. Barrett's backyard, he requested that the Firm refund the $2,500 
retainer Mr. Petersen had originally paid to the Firm. Again, this conduct evidences 
a conscious objective to keep for himself the value of the construction work 
performed by Mr. Petersen in exchange for the legal services provided by the Firm. 
Additionally, when Mr. Williams gave a $3,500 check to Mr. Barrett to make 
up the difference between the value of the legal services and the construction work, 
Mr. Barrett intentionally concealed that fact from the Firm and deposited the money 
into his personal account. 
The trial court found that Mr. Barrett entered into agreements with both Mr. 
Williams and Mr. Petersen to exchange legal services for construction work and 
that the agreements were entered without the Firm's knowledge or consent. The 
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trial court further found that the Firm was entitled to the value of the construction 
work performed by both clients at Mr. Barrett's personal residence. The evidence 
clearly established that Mr. Barrett had an intent to keep for himself the value of 
payments which rightfully belonged to his Firm and to conceal that fact from the 
Firm. This Court should conclude that Mr. Barrett's conduct amounts to intentional 
misappropriation. 
Ill. Disbarment Is The Presumptive Sanction For Misappropriation. 
Pursuant to rule 14-605(a) of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions, disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as 
defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct with the intent to benefit the lawyer or 
another or to deceive the court, and causes serious or 
potentially serious injury to a party, the public, or the legal 
system, or causes serious or potentially serious interference 
with a legal proceedings; or 
(a)(2) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary 
element of which includes intentional interference with the 
administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, 
fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft, or the sale, 
distribution, or importation of controlled substances; or the 
intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or 
solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses; or 
(a)(3) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously 
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
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Misappropriation can fall into any of these three broad categories. Even 
without a criminal conviction for misappropriation under paragraph (a)(2), 
misappropriating firm funds will still warrant disbarment under paragraphs (a)(1) 
or (a)(3). 
In the case of In re Johnson, 48 P.3d 881, 885 (2001 ), this Court found 
that disbarment was appropriate under both paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(3) 
because misappropriation is conduct involving dishonesty that seriously reflects 
on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. This Court has been unequivocal in its 
declarations that, "an intentional act of misappropriation of a client's funds is an 
act that merits disbarment." In the Matter of the Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 217 (Utah 
1997). The OPC respectfully asks the Court to hold that intentional 
misappropriation of firm funds is an act that likewise merits disbarment. 
Mr. Barrett's conduct clearly satisfies the elements of 14-605(a)(1 ). He 
knowingly engaged in the misconduct when he entered into the agreements with 
the Firm's clients to trade legal services for construction work. Mr. Barrett's 
intent was to benefit himself inasmuch as the construction work was performed at 
his personal residence. The Firm was injured by Mr. Barrett's conduct because 
he, not the Firm, received the benefit of the wrought iron railing and the shed in 
his back yard. Additionally, Mr. Barrett, not the Firm, received the $3,500 paid by 
Mr. Williams for the legal services performed on his behalf. 
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The misconduct also satisfies the elements of 14-605(a)(3). Entering into 
the secret agreements with the Firm's clients was intentional misconduct that 
involved dishonesty and deceit. And stealing money, whether from a client or a 
firm , is something that seriously adversely reflects on a lawyer's fitness to 
practice law. 
Whether under 14-605(a)(1 ), (a)(2) or (a)(3), Mr. Barrett's misconduct 
warrants the sanction of disbarment. An attorney who is willing to deceive his 
partners and keep for himself property which belongs to his firm is one who has 
"demonstrated by [his] conduct that [he] is unable or unlikely to be unable to 
discharge properly [his] professional responsibilities ." 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions) 
(Rule 14-602(b), 
In the present case, the trial court appears to have reached its conclusion 
that suspension was an appropriate sanction because this Court's prior holdings 
only dealt with misappropriation of client funds. In fact, the trial court stated, "the 
court does not find that client funds were taken and that disbarment is not 
mandated in this case. " (R. 430) 
This Court should hold that intentional misappropriation, from anyone, 
merits disbarment. As stated above, "it should matter little whether the theft or 
misappropriation is from an attorney's partners, associates, clients, family or 
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friends."2 "A plainly-wrong act is not immunized because the victims are one's 
partners."3 
IV. There Is No Mitigation That Would Justify A Departure From The 
Sanction of Disbarment. 
In cases involving the intentional misappropriation of client funds, this 
Court has held that, "a downward departure from the presumptive sanction of 
disbarment is appropriate only when a lawyer demonstrates truly compelling 
mitigating circumstances." In the Matter of Grimes, 2012 UT 87 ,I 15. The same 
standard should apply to all cases of intentional misappropriation, regardless of 
the victim. In the present case, the mitigating circumstances are not truly 
compelling and do not justify a downward departure from disbarment. The trial 
court found the following mitigating factors: absence of prior record ; restitution 
and efforts to rectify the consequences of the misconduct involved ; cooperation 
with the OPC throughout the proceedings; and "a partial understanding of actions 
[Mr. Barrett] should have taken with his firm to avoid the problems." (R. 430) 
With regard to aggravating circumstances, the trial court found: dishonest 
or selfish motive; multiple offenses; and refusal to acknowledge the wrongful 
nature of the misconduct. (R. 430) 
2 In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Yajko, 674 N.E. 2d 684, 687 (Ohio 1997). 
3 In the Matter of Siegel, 627 A.2d. 156, 159 (N.J . 1993). 
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When weighed against the aggravating factors, there is nothing truly 
compelling about the mitigating circumstances that would warrant a departure 
from the presumptive sanction. There is nothing remarkable about Mr. Barrett's 
absence of a prior record of discipline or his cooperation with the OPC, and they 
do not ameliorate the theft of funds belonging to his partners. 
While the trial court did not elaborate on its finding that Mr. Barrett had, "a 
partial understanding of actions he should have taken with his firm to avoid the 
problems," it is likely this factor is related to the California Matter. In that matter, 
Mr. Barrett sought reimbursement from the Firm for a meal he claimed was for 
business development. (R. 374) However, Mr. Barrett was not actually in 
attendance at the meal. Rather, it was Mr. Barrett's wife and a friend of hers who 
had lunch together in California, and Mr. Barrett only spoke to his wife's friend 
over the phone about a legal issue. At trial, Mr. Barrett acknowledged he could 
have provided more information to the Firm, and the trial court found that Mr. 
Barrett "withheld information that would allow the Firm to properly evaluate 
whether the expense was legitimate." (R. 377) It is not likely the trial court 
intended this mitigating factor to apply to Mr. Barrett's agreements to exchange 
legal services for construction work because Mr. Barrett has denied that any 
such agreements existed. Regardless , having a partial understanding of what 
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could have been done differently is not a truly compelling mitigating factor when 
the misconduct involves stealing funds. 
The trial court's finding of, "restitution and efforts to rectify the 
consequences of the misconduct involved," is likewise not a truly compelling 
circumstance. After Mr. Barrett's employment with the Firm was terminated 
following a confrontation regarding his reimbursement practices, Mr. Barrett and 
the Firm reached an agreement. The Firm agreed to not seek repayment from 
Mr. Barrett for the funds it believed were improperly reimbursed, and Mr. Barrett 
agreed to waive his claim that his partnership shares be repurchased by the 
Firm. (See Settlement Agreement, Trial Exhibit 66, not attached hereto) 
To the extent the agreement between Mr. Barrett and the Firm could be 
considered "restitution," it is not the type of restitution that would mitigate the 
offense. This Court addressed a similar situation in In the Matter of the Discipline 
of Lundgren , 2015 UT 58 ~22: 
It is true that Mr. Lundgren ultimately restored Ms. Best's 
funds, but this factor is not mitigating where there is no 
evidence to show that remorse was his motivation for restoring 
the funds. Tellingly, Mr. Lundgren did not self-report his 
unethical conduct or restore the funds to Ms. Best until after 
she had lodged a complaint with the OPC. Thus, it seems 
likely that his restoration of the funds was merely-a·n. attempt to 
avoid punishment. Under rule 14-607(c)(1) of the Supreme 
Court Rules of Professional Practice, "compelled restitution" 
cannot be considered a mitigating factor. 
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Similarly, Mr. Barrett did not self-report his misconduct, which is consistent 
with his denial of the existence of any agreement to trade legal services for the 
construction work. Therefore, any restitution that might have occurred is not a 
mitigating factor that warrants a departure from the presumptive sanction of 
disbarment. 
In sum, none of the mitigating factors found by the trial court are truly 
compelling and this Court should impose the presumptive sanction of disbarment 
for Mr. Barrett's intentional misappropriation of firm funds. 
CONCLUSION 
Intentional misappropriation is an act that warrants disbarment, regardless 
of whether the victim is a client or a partner. Mr. Barrett engaged in intentional 
misappropriation when he accepted the $3,500 check from Mr. Williams and 
when he entered into secret agreements with Mr. Williams and Mr. Petersen to 
trade legal services for construction work at his personal residence. Disbarment 
is the presumptive sanction for such misconduct and there are no truly 
compelling mitigating factors that would justify a departure from the presumptive 
level of discipline. Therefore, this Court should exercise its inherent authority 
and disbar Mr. Barrett from the practice of law in Utah. 
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Dated: January 7th, 2015. 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL:--CONDUCT ....__ ___ ____ 
~ \ 
Todd Wahlquist'i 
Deputy Senior Counsel 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Discipline of: 
JOSEPH P. BARRETT #8088 
Re3pondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 130907818 
Judge Robert P. Fau,t 
This matter came before the Court on January 27, 2015, for an Adjudication Trial pursuant to 
Rule 14-51 l(e) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD"). The Utah State Ba.r' s 
Office of Professional Conduct was represented by Todd Wahlquist, Deputy Senior Counsel, and 
Respondent, Joseph P. Barrett, was represented by-counsel, George M. Haley and J. Andrew Sjoblom, of 
Holland and Hart. Prior to trial, both counsel stipulated to undisputed facts which a.re set forth below. 
Further, having heard the evidence and the arguments of counsel, the Court hereby makes the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
STIPULATED FACTS 
I. Joseph P. Barrett, who is an attorney in the State of Utah and a member of the Utah State 
Bar, is charged with unprofessional conduct. The Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct in its 
Amended Complaint brought three counts of violation of Rule 8.4(c) - Misconduct. Count I - Williams 
Matter, Count II- Petersen matter and Count Ill - California Matter. Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct) states: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. 
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2. According to the records of the Executive Director of the Utah State Bar, Joseph P. 
Barrett's address is in Salt Lake City, Utah 84103. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Rule 14-
51 l(b) of the RLDD, in that, at all relevant times, Respondent resided in Salt Lake County and the alleged 
misconduct originated in Salt Lake County. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to RuJe 14-
511 (a), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability (amended January 1, 2003) ("RLDD"). 
3. The Complaint was brought pursuant to a directive of a Screening Panel of the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court, and is based upon an Informal Complaint submitted by 
Andrew Morse against Joseph P. Barrett. 
4. On February 15, 2013, the OPC sent Mr. Barrett an Amended Notice of Informal 
Complaint ("NOIC"). 
5. On September 5, 2013, a Screening Panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the 
Utah Supreme Court ("the Screening Panel") hea:rd the matter. 
6. At the conclusion of the hearing on September 5, 2013, the Screening Panel directed the 
OPC to file a formal complaint against Mr. Barrett. 
7. Joseph Barrett was employed at the firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau ("the Firm") 
from 2003 until February 2012. 
WILLIAMS MA TIER 
STIPULATED FACTS 
8. Richard Williams is the owner of Dick's Backhoe and Sewer Connection. 
9. In June 2007, Mr. Williams' son was charged in a criminal matter. 
10. On June 15, 2007, Mr. Barrett appeared in the criminal matter. 
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11. On July 30, 2007, Mr. Williams paid a $1,000.00 retainer that was deposited into the 
Firm's trust account under the name Dick's Backhoe and Sewer. 
12. This criminal matter was closed in December 2007. 
13. Mr. Barrett did not bill any time against the retainer in this first criminal matter in 2007. 
14. In 2008, Mr. Williams asked Mr. Barrett to assist him in a collections matter for his 
company. 
15. A small amount of work was performed by Mr. Barrett on behalf of Dick's Backhoe and 
Sewer. 
16. On April 3, 2008, $175 in legal fees were charged to Mr. Williams' account. 
17. On August 1, 2008, Mr. Barrett requested the $175 charge to be written-off Mr. 
Williams' bill. 
18. On August 7, 2008, $60 in legal fees (without interest) were charged to Mr. Williams. 
19. On August 29, 2008, Mr. Barrett requested the $60 charge to be written-off Mr. 
Williams' bill. 
20. In the summer of 2008, Mr. Williams performed construction work at Mr. Barrett's 
personal residence. 
21. On September 5, 2008, $225 in legal fees were charged to Mr. Williams. 
22. On September 5, 2008, Mr. Barrett requested the $225 charge to be written-off Mr. 
Williams' bill. 
23. In Februl!I)' 2010, Mr. Williams' son was charged in several new criminal matters, 
including a felony. 
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24. Mr. Williams contacted Mr. Barrett about representing his son again. 
25. In March 201 0, Mr. Barrett filed appearances in the criminal matters. 
26. Between March 2010 and July 2010, Mr. Barrett billed $7,665 to Mr. Williams' account 
27. In March 2010, Mr. Williams paid $300 to the finn by credit card. 
28. In or around June or July 2010, Mr. Williams provided construction services to Mr. 
Barrett at his personal residence in the fonn of a wrought iron railing. 
29. Between June 14 and June 25, Mrr Barrett requested a total of $7,446.57 in fees, costs, 
and interest to be written-off Mr. Williams' bill. 
30. Mr. Williams was not able to complete the railing project. 
3 I. On July 21, 2010, Mr. or Mrs. Williams wrote a check for $3,500 made out to Mr. Barrett 
personally. 
32. Mr. Barrett deposited the $3,500 into his personal account. 
33. The Firm was unaware that Mr. Williams paid $3,500 directly to Mr. Barrett for legal 
services. 
34. Between June 3, 2011 and August 3, 2011, Mr. Barrett billed $400 in legal fees to Mr. 
Williams' account. 
35. On December 27, 2011, $400 was billed against the $1,000 retainer that had been 
deposited in 2007. 
36. On April 26, 2012, after Mr. Barrett left the Firm, the Firm refunded $600 to Mr. 
Williams, representing the balance of the trust account. 
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37. Of the $8,612.07 in total fees, costs and interest billed to Mr. Williams, he only paid $700 
to the firm, and the remaining $7,912.07 was written-off. 
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT FROM TRIAL 
38. Mr. Williams retained the Firm through Mr. Barrett to represent his son. 
39. The Court, after hearing the testimony of Mr. Barrett, does not give much weight to the 
same, Mr. Barrett testified the railing installed at his house by Mr. Williams was a gift and he wrote-off 
the retainer and bills to help Mr. Williams, in contrast to the testimony of Mr. Williams, who clearly and 
without hesitation admitted he traded the iron work at the home of Mr. Barrett in exchange for the legal 
fees relating to his son's criminal matter. Mr. Williams further tes~ified he was the one who suggested the 
trade. Further, Mr. Williams testified since the railing was not completed, he determined how much he 
had personally already paid out in costs on the railing work to third parties and then determined how 
much he owed Mr. Barrett for the balance of the legal work for his son and sent a check of SJ,5000 for 
the difference to Mr. Barrett. Mr. Williams also testified the person working on the railing was not his 
brother-in-law, which is contrary to Mr. Barrett's testimony. 
40. Mr. Barrett and Mr. Williams reached an agreement whereby Mr. Barrett would provide 
legal services in exchange for construction services performed by Mr. Williams at Mr. Barrett's personal 
residence. Mr. Williams testified this agreement was an oral agreement and nothing was in writing 
between he and Mr. Barrett. 
41. The Firm was unaware of the agreement between Mr. Barrett and Mr. Williams. 
42. The value of the construction services did not equal the value of the legal services. 
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43. Mr. Williams, or his wife on his behalf, directly paid Mr. Barrett $3,500 which Mr. 
Williams testified was the difference between the value of the legal services and the value of the 
construction services since they were not equal amounts. 
44. The $3,500 paid by Mr. Williams to Mr. Barrett belonged to the Firm. 
45. Of the $8,612.07 in total fees, costs and interest billed to Mr. Williams, he only paid $700 
to the firm, and the remaining $7,912.07 was written-off by Mr. Barrett and thus by Mr. Banett's firm. 
46. The Firm was entitled to the value of the construction services perfonned by Mr. 
Williams at Mr. Barrett's personal residence. 
PETERSEN MATIER 
STIPULATED FACTS 
47. Dave Petersen is one of the owners ofD&T Landscaping. 
48. Between 2006 and 2009, D&T provided various landscaping services to Mr. Barrett at his 
personal residence. 
49. Mr. Barrett paid D&T for these landscaping services. 
50. In November 2010, Mr. Petersen retained Mr. Barrett and the Finn to represent him in a 
custody modification matter. 
5 I. On November 2, 20 I 0, Mr. Petersen paid a $2,500 retainer to the Firm that was deposited 
into the Firm's trust account. 
52. Initially, it was anticipated that a shed would be built for approximately $5,000. 
53. Between November 2010 and August 2011 , the Firm billed $8,801.10 in fees, costs and 
interest to Mr. Petersen's account. 
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54. Mr. Petersen received regular bills from the Finn. 
55. Mr. Petersen's modification case was concluded on or about July 20,'2011. 
56. On or about August 9, 2011, Mr. Petersen or D&T started construction on the shed at Mr. 
Barrett's personal residence. 
57. On August 25, 2011, Mr. Barren requested the accounting department at the Firm to 
write-off approximately half of Mr. Petersen's bill. 
58. On September 20, 2011, Mr. Barrett requested the accounting department at the Firm to 
write-off half of the remaining balance on Mr. Petersen's bill. 
59. On November 22, 2011, Mr. Barrett requested the accounting department at the firm to 
write-off the remaining balance on Mr. Petersen's bill. 
60. In the end, Mr. Barrett requested to be written-off a total of $8,913.54 in legal fees, costs 
and interest on Mr. Petersen's account. 
61. Mr. Petersen finished most of the construction on Mr. Barrett's shed by December 2011. 
62. On or about December 13, 201 I, Mr. Barren requested the accounting department to 
refund the $2,500 retainer paid by Mr. Petersen. 
63. The Finn refunded the $2,500 lo Mr. Petersen. 
64. On December 14, 2011, Mr. Barrett wrote a letter to Mr. Petersen stating that the Finn 
had provided $10,577.25 in legal services to Mr. Petersen. 
65. Mr. Petersen did not pay the Finn for any of the legal services provided. 
66. In February 2012 Mr. Barrett's employment with the Finn ended. 
67. ln April 2012, Mr. Barrett made two payments to D&T for the shed totaling $3,030. 
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68. In addition, in November 2011, Mr. Barrett paid $758 directly to the company that 
painted the shed, and in September 2011 paid $ I ,204 to Home Depot for doors and windows for the shed. 
69. For the shed, Mr. Barrett paid approximately $5,000. 
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT FROM TRIAL 
70. Mr. Barrett and Mr. Petersen reached an agreement whereby Mr. Barrett would provide 
legal services to Mr. Petersen for his custody matter in exchange for a shed to be constructed by Mr. 
Petersen at Mr. Barrett's personal residence. 
71 . Mr. Petersen testified there was an oral agreement, not a written agreement between Mr. 
Barrett and himself to build the shed in exchange for Mr. Barrett's legal work. Mr. Petersen testified this 
agreement was made before the work on the shed began. Mr. Petersen testified his first estimate for the 
shed was $5,000 as a starting point and they would go :from there. Mr. Petersen testified it was not a flat 
rate contract. 
72. Mr. Petersen testified the agreement with Mr. Barrett included his paying a $2,500.00 
retainer up :front and he would get the $2,500.00 at the end of their agreement The Court finds the 
testimony of Mr. Barrett that he refunded the $2,500.00 retainer because Mr. Petersen wanted to visit his 
son in Hawaii and he had no money misleading, and an attempt to explain the refund of the retainer to Mr. 
Petersen without admitting there was an agreement in advance to return the '$2,500 retainer to Mr. 
Petersen. Mr. Petersen did not testify as to what reason he gave or what was stated to Mr. Barrett when 
he got his retainer back, other than the refund of the $2,500 was part of their agreement. Despite Mr. 
Petersen not so testifying, he very well may have needed his retainer money to fund his travel to Hawaii 
to see his son and may have indicated the same to Mr. Barrett. Thus, the Court cannot definitively 
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determine Mr. Barrett falsely testified to the Court that Mr. Petersen asked for a retainer refund and the 
reason why he needed the money. The Court, however, finds the return of the retainer funds was not for 
the reason stated by Mr. Barrett, i.e. he was attempting to help Mr. Petersen, but rather was a return of 
Mr. Petersen's funds as they had agreed. 
73. Mr. Petersen received regular bills from the Firm, but did not pay them because Mr. 
Barrett told him not to worry about them. Mr. Petersen testified he was going to talce care of the bills and 
costs at D&T and Mr. Barrett would take care of the bills incurred by him. 
74. On December 14, 2011, Mr. Barrett wrote a letter to Mr. Petersen stating that the Firm 
had provided SI0,577.25 in legal services lo Mr. Petersen. Mr. Barrett stated he had been asked to 
provide this Jetter by Mr. Petersen and he did not know the reason why Mr. Peterson needed the letter. 
However, Mr. Petersen testified he was surprised to get this letter from Mr. Barrett. 
75. In constructing the shed, Mr. Petersen incurred approximately $8,700 in time and labor 
costs. 
76. In February 2012, after being confronted by the Finn regarding other accounting issues, 
Mr. Barrett's employment with the Finn ended. 
77. For the shed, which has an asserted value or cost of approximately $23,700, Mr. Barrett 
paid approximately SS,000. Mr. Petersen testified he would have reduced the January 2, 2012 invoice by 
Sl,000.00 and the rest of the invoice is correct. Sec. Exhibit 38 pp. 7-8. Mr. Petersen testified the actual 
cost of the shed, without the costs paid by Mr. Barrett himself is $ I 5, 170.63 as reflected on Ex. 38 p. 6. 
78. The Finn was unaware of the agreement between Mr. Barrett and Mr. Petersen to trade 
legal services for a shed. 
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79. The Finn was entitled to the value of the construction services perfonned by Mr. Petersen 




80. On January 25, 2012, Mr. Barrett submitted an expense report seeking reimbursement 
from the Firm for $123.54 for a meal that he olaimed was for business development 
81. The receipt attached to the expense report showed that the meal was at a restaurant in Los 
Angeles, California, on January 5, 2012. 
82. The meal was charged to the credit card of Mr. Barrett's wife. 
83. The Firm reimbursed Mr. Barrett for the cost of the meal. 
84. The court docket shows that Mr. Barrett appeared in person in Wasatch County Justice 
Court at a pretrial conference on January 5, 2012. 
85. Mr. Barrett's billing records show that he billed for 6.5 hours of work on January 5, 2012, 
and there are no references to a meeting or phone call with anyone in Los Angeles that day. 
86. The lunch guest never retained the Finn. 
ADDmONAL FINDINGS OF FACT FROM 1RIAL 
87. Mr. Barrett testified he discussed a legal issue with his wife's lunch guest over the phone 
and no evidence to the contrary was provided. 
88. The manner in which Mr. Barrett sought reimbursement was deceptive in that the 
information provided to the Finn gave no indication that Mr. Barrett was not actually at the lunch meeting 
• 
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and was contrary, according to the testimony of Mr. Morris, to the informal understanding among the 
members of the Finn that a face-to-face meeting with a client was needed in order to be a legitimate 
business development cost which would be paid by the finn. 
General Facts 
89. The Policy at the firm from 2005 to 201 I required amounts above $4,000 which the 
partners wanted to write-off or write-down required Executive Committee approval. See Exhibit 58, Bates 
485. Mr. Barrett was a member of a committee at the Finn which would have given him knowledge of 
the threshold amount and Mr. Barrett was aware of a threshold amount. It was admitted by Mr. Morris, 
President of the Firm, this policy threshold level was not enforced and in January 2012 a new policy went 
into effect. 
90. Mr. Morris further testified there was no oversight by the Finn on costs and business 
development costs and it was the honor system that was in place amongst the attorneys. 
91. Mr. Morris testified it was the business expense reimbursement request form admitted as 
Ex. 56 page 236 which caused concern and led to further review of Mr. Barrett's cost requests. The 
concerns included the fact most of the dates on the request form were on a weekend and Item 3 was for 
skiing at Soldier Hollow, with the "entertained" or person with whom business development was done 
had Mr. Barrett's wife's family name of"Roegiers". Mr. Morris testified a further review by him and 
the Finn was done into the expenses and cost reimbursement request submitted by Mr. Barrett. This 
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review led to the discovery of the infonnation and issues of the California Meal reimbursement which 
became Count III of the complaint against Mr. Barrett. 
92. Mr. Morris testified all legal services perfonned by the attorneys at the Finn, belong to 
the Finn according to their employee contracts. No attorneys are allowed to do legal work outside the 
Finn. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court concludes as a matter of law that Mr. Barrett violated the following rules: 
WTI.,LIAMS MA TIER 
93. Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct) states: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. 
94. Mr. Barrett engaged in conduct involving dishonesty and deceit when he accepted 
payment directly from the client without the Firm'.s knowledge, thereby misappropriating $3,500 in legal 
fees that belonged to the Firm. 
95. Mr. Barrett further engaged in conduct involving dishonesty and deceit when he wrote• 
off bills that were due to the Finn in exchange for receiving construction services from Mr. Williams at 
bis personal residence without the Firm's knowledge. 
96. By engaging in conduct involving dishonesty and deceit, Mr. Barrett violated Rule 8.4(c). 
97. Mr. Barrett's violation of the rule with regard to the Williams matter was intentional and 
done with the intent to personally benefit himself. Mr. Barrett's conduct resulted in harm to the Firm and 
the profession. 
• 
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PETERSEN MATTER 
98. Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct) states: 
lt is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. 
99. Mr. Barrett engaged in conduct involving dishonesty and deceit when he wrote-off bills 
that were due to the Finn in exchange for a shed constructed by Mr. Petersen at his personal residence 
without the Finn's knowledge. 
JOO. By engaging in conduct involving dishonesty and deceit, Mr. Barrett violated Rule 8.4(c). 
101. Mr. Barrett's violation of the rule with regard to the Petersen matter was intentional and 
done with the intent to personally benefit himself. 
102. Mr. Barrett's conduct resulted in harm to the Finn and the profession. 
CALIFORNIA MATfER 
103. Ruic 8.4(c) (Misconduct) states: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. 
104. Mr. Barrett engaged in conduct involving dishonesty and deceit by seeking 
reimbursement for client development expenses for a meal in Los Angeles when, in fact, he was in Utah 
on that day attending to other matters. Mr. Barrett withheld infonnotion that would allow the Finn to 
properly evaluate whether the expense was legitimate. By engaging in conduct involving dishonesty and 
deceit, Mr. Barrett violated Rule 8.4(c). 
I 05. Mr. Barrett's conduct was intentional and done with the intent to benefit himself. 
106. Mr. Barrett's conduct resulted in harm to the Finn. 
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ORDER 
Because the Court finds that Mr. Barrett has violated Rule 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, the Court shall conduct a sanctions hearing. That hearing is set for March 3, 2015, at 1 :00 p.m. 
to 2:00 p.rn., in Courtroom N41. 
Entered this I Ith da.y ofFebruary, 2015. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed/emailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order, to the following, this I Ith day ofFebruary, 2015: 
Todd Wahlquist 
Deputy Senior Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
opcfiling@utahbar.org 
George M. Haley 
J. Andrew Sjoblom 
Attorneys for Respondent 
222 S. Main Street, Suite 2200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 l 0 I 
GMHaley@hollandhart.com 
JASjoblom@hollandhart.com 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Discipline of: 
JOSEPH P. BARRETT #8088 
Respondent. 
ORDER OF SUSPENSION 
CASE NO. 130907818 
Judge Robert P. Faust 
Deputy Clerk 
This matter came before the Court on March 2, 2015, for a Sanctions Hearing. The Office of 
Professional Conduct ("OPC") was represented by Todd Wahlquist. The Respondent, Joseph Barrett, 
was represented by George M. Haley. Testimony· was given by various witnesses. The Court having 
considered the evidence, testimony, and aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented, finds and 
concludes as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
On February l l, 2015, the Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, 
finding that Mr. Barrett had violated the following Rule of Professional Conduct on three occasions 
identified as the Williams matter, Petersen matter and the California matter: 
Violation of Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct) 
Rule 8.4 (Misconduct), Rules of Professional Conduct, provides as follows: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud , deceit or misrepresentation. 
Further, the above Findings and Conclusions are referred to and incorporated herein, with the 
Court now amending the signed findings by moving paragraph Nos. 33 and 52 from the section of 
stipulated findings to the section on additional findings of fact from trial by this reference. 
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DISCIPLINE 
Based upon Mr. Barrett's violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, a Sanctions Hearing 
was held on March 2, 2015. After hearing evidence and argument, the Court finds and concludes as 
follows: 
1. Mr. Barrett violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as outlined in the Findings and 
Conclusions. 
2. Mr. Barrett violated the Rules of Professional Conduct knowingly and intentionally. 
3. Mr. Barrett's conduct caused actual injury but the injured party has been made whole. 
4. The Court finds the following aggravating circumstances: 
a. Dishonest or selfish motive; 
b. Multiple offenses; 
c. Refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct. 
5. The Court finds the following mitigating circumstances: 
a. Absence ofa prior record; 
b. Restitution and efforts to rectify the consequences of the misconduct involved; 
c. Cooperation with the OPC throughout the proceedings; 
d. A partial understanding of actions he should have taken with his firm to avoid the 
problems. 
6. The Court does not find that client funds were taken and that disbarment is not mandated 
in this case. 
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7. Based upon all of the factors above and based upon the Stand_ards for Imposing Lawyer 
Discipline, the Court finds that a suspension from the practice of law for a period of time 
is the appropriate sanction for Mr. Barrett's misconduct. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that Joseph Barrett shall be suspended from the practice of law for a 
period of 150 days effective 30 days from the date of this Order. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Mr. Barrett shall comply with all requirements of Rule 14-526(a) 
of the Ru les of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Mr. Barrett shall pay costs incurred by the OPC in prosecuting this 
action. 
Dated this 3rd day of March, 2015. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed/emailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order of 
Suspension, to the following, this 3rd day of March, 2015: 
Todd Wahlquist 
Deputy Senior Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
opcfiling@utahbar.org 
George M. Haley 
J. Andrew Sjoblom 
Attorneys for Respondent 
222 S. Main Street, Suite 2200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
GMHaley@hollandhart.com 
JASjoblom@hollandhart.com 
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Article 6. Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
Rule 14-601. Definitions. 
As used in this article: 
(a) "complainant" means the person who files .an informal complaint or the OPC when 
the OPC determines to open an investigation based on information it has received ; 
(b) "formal complaint" means a complaint filed in the district court alleging misconduct 
by a lawyer or seeking the transfer of a lawyer to disability status; 
(c) "informal complaint" means any written , notarized allegation of misconduct by or 
incapacity of a lawyer; 
(d) "injury" means harm to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession which 
results from a lawyer's misconduct. The level of injury can range from "serious" injury to 
"little or no" injury; a reference to "injury" alone indicates any level of injury greater than 
"little or no" injury; · 
(e) "intent" means the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result; 
(f) "knowledge" means the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant 
circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to 
accomplish a particular result; 
(g) "negligence" means the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk that 
circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the 
standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation; 
(h) "potential injury" means the harm to a client, the public, the legal system or the 
profession that is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the lawyer's misconduct, and 
which, but for some intervening factor or event, would probably have resulted from the 
lawyer's misconduct; 
(i) "respondent" means a lawyer subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court against whom an informal or formal complaint has been filed; and 
U) "Rules of Professional Conduct" means the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
(including the accompanying comments) initially adopted by the Supreme Court in 1988, 
as amended from time to time. 
Addendum Exhibit 4 
Rule 14-602. Purpose and nature of sanctions. 
(a) Summary. This article is based on the Black Letter Rules contained in the Standards 
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions prepared by the American Bar Association's Center for 
Professional Responsibility. They have been substantially revised by the Supreme 
Court. Notably, ABA Standards 4 through 8 have been reduced into a single Rule 14-
605. 
· (b) Purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings. The purpose of imposing lawyer sanctions 
is to ensure and maintain the high standard of professional conduct required of those 
who undertake the discharge of professional responsibilities as lawyers, and to protect 
the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have demonstrated by 
their conduct that they are unable or likely to be unable to discharge properly their 
professional responsibilities. 
(c) Public nature of lawyer discipline proceedings. Ultimate disposition of lawyer 
discipline shall be public in cases of disbarment, suspension, and reprimand, and 
nonpublic in cases of admonition. 
(d) Purpose of these rules. These rules are designed for use in imposing a sanction or 
sanctions following a determination that a member of the legal profession has violated a 
provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Descriptions in these rules of 
substantive disciplinary offenses are not intended to create grounds for determining 
culpability independent of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The rules constitute a 
system for determining sanctions, permitting flexibility and creativity in assigning 
sanctions in particular cases of lawyer misconduct. They are designed to promote: 
(d)(1) consideration of all factors relevant to _imposing the appropriate level of sanction 
in an individual case; 
(d)(2) consideration of the appropriate weight of such factors in light of the stated goals 
of lawyer discipline; and 
(d)(3) consistency in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the same or similar 
offenses within and among jurisdictions. 
Addendum Exhibit 5 
Rule 14-603. Sanctions. 
(a) Scope. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or 
acknowledgement that the lawyer has engaged in professional misconduct. 
(b) Disbarment. Disbarment terminates the individual's status as a lawyer. A lawyer who 
has been disbarred may be readmitted as provided in Rule 14-525. 
(c) Suspension. Suspension is the removal of a lawyer from the practice of law for a 
specified minimum period of time. Generally, suspension should be imposed for a 
specific period of time equal to or greater than six months, but in no event should the 
time period prior to application for reinstatement be more than three years . 
(c)(1) A lawyer who has been suspended for six months or less may be reinstated as 
set forth in Rule 14-524. 
(c)(2) A lawyer who has been suspended for more than six months may be reinstated 
as set forth in Rule 14-525. 
(d) Interim suspension . Interim suspension is the temporary suspension of a lawyer 
from the practice of law. Interim suspension may be imposed as set forth in Rules 14-
518 and 14-519. 
(e) Reprimand. Reprimand is public discipline which declares the conduct of the lawyer 
improper, but does not limit the lawyer's right to practice. 
(f) Admonition. Admonition is nonpublic discipline which declares the conduct of the 
lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer's right to practice. 
(g) Probation. Probation is a sanction that allows a lawyer to practice law under 
specified conditions. Probation can be public or nonpublic, can be imposed alone or in 
conjunction with other sanctions, and can be imposed as a condition of readmission or 
reinstatement. 
(h) Resignation with discipline pending. Resignation with discipline pending is a form of 
public discipline which allows a respondent to resign from the practice of law while 
either an informal or formal complaint is pending against the respondent. Resignation 
with discipline pending may be imposed as set forth in Rule 14-521. 
r (i) Other sanctions and remedies. Other sanctions and remedies which may be imposed 
include: 
(i)(1) restitution; 
(i)(2) assessment of costs; 
(i)(3) limitation upon practice; 
(i)(4) appointment of a receiver; 
(i)(5) a requirement that the lawyer take the Bar Examination or professional 
responsibility examination; and 
(i)(6) a requirement that the lawyer attend continuing education courses. 
U) Reciprocal discipline. Reciprocal discipline is the imposition of a disciplinary sanction 
on a lawyer who has been disciplined in another court, another jurisdiction, or a 
regulatory body having disciplinary jurisdiction. 
Addendum Exhibit 6 
Rule 14-605. Imposition of sanctions. 
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out 
in Rule 14-604, the following sanctions are generally appropriate. 
(a) Disbarment. Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), 
or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to benefit the lawyer or 
another or to deceive the court, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a 
party, the public, or the legal system, or causes serious or potentially serious 
interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(a)(2) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes 
intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, 
misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution, or 
importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of another; or an attempt 
or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses; or 
(a)(3) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice 
law. 
(b) Suspension. Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(b)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d),' (e), 
or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury or potential injury to a 
party, the public, or the legal system, or causes interference or potential interference 
with a legal proceeding; or 
(b)(2) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements listed in Rule 14-
605(a)(2) but nevertheless seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice 
law. 
(c) Reprimand. Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(c)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), 
or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury to a party, the public, or 
the legal system, or causes interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(c)(2) engages in any other misconduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
(d) Admonition. Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(d)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d) , (e), 
or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes little or no injury to a party, the 
public, or the legal system or interference with a legal proceeding , but exposes a party, 
the public, or the legal system to potential injury or causes potential interference with a 
legal proceeding; or 
(d)(2) engages in any professional misconduct not otherwise identified in this rule that 
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
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Rule 14-607. Aggravation and mitigation. 
After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating circumstances may 
be considered and weighed in deciding what sanction to impose. 
(a) Aggravating circumstances. Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or 
factors that may justify an increas.e in the degree of discipline to be imposed. 
Aggravating circumstances may include: 
(a)(1) prior record of discipline; 
(a)(2) dishonest or selfish motive; 
(a)(3) a pattern of misconduct; 
(a)(4) multiple offenses; 
(a)(5) obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with 
rules or orders of the disciplinary authority; 
(a)(6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices 
during the disciplinary process; 
(a)(7) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct involved, either to 
the client or to the disciplinary authority; 
(a)(8) vulnerability of victim; 
(a)(9) substantial experience in the practice of law; 
(a)(10) lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the 
misconduct involved ; and 
(a)(11) illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances. 
(b) Mitigating circumstances. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors 
that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. Mitigating 
circumstances may include: 
(b)(1) absence of a prior record of discipline; 
(b)(2) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; 
(b)(3) personal or emotional problems; 
(b)(4) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the 
misconduct involved ; 
(b)(5) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to the 
discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; 
(b)(6) inexperience in the practice of law; 
(b)(7) good character or reputation; 
(b)(B) physical disability; 
(b)(9) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when: 
(b)(9)(A) the respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and 
(b)(9)(B) the substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the 
misconduct; and 
(b)(9)(C) the respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental disability is 
demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and 
(b)(9)(D) the recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that misconduct is 
unlikely; · 
(b)(10) unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings, provided that the respondent did 
not substantially contribute to the delay and provided further that the respondent has 
demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay; 
(b)(11) interim reform in circumstances not involving mental disability or impairment; 
(b)(12) imposition of other penalties or sanctions; 
(b)(13) remorse; and 
(b)(14) remoteness of prior offenses. 
(c) Other circumstances. The following circumstances should not be considered as 
either aggravating or mitigating: 
(c)(1) forced or compelled restitution; 
(c)(2) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer; 
(c)(3) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings; 
(c)(4) complainant's recommendation as to sanction ; and 
(c)(5) failure of injured client to complain. 
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Rule 8.4. Misconduct. 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly 
assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; 
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; 
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; 
(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or 
official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional 
Conduct or other law; or 
(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of 
applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law. 
Comment 
I1] Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to violate the 
Rules of Professional Conduct or knowingly assist or induce another to do so 
through the acts of another, as when they request or instruct an agent to do so 
on the lawyer's behalf. Paragraph (a), however, does not prohibit a lawyer from 
advising a client concerning action the client is legally entitled to take. 
I1 a] A violation of paragraph (a) based solely on the lawyer's violation of 
another Rule of Professional Conduct shall not be charged as a separate 
violation. However, this rule defines professional misconduct as a violation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct as the term professional misconduct is used in the 
Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice, including the Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. In this respect, if a lawyer violates any of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct, the appropriate discipline may be imposed pursuant to 
Rule 14-605. 
[2] Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, 
such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income 
tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such implication. 
Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving "moral 
turpitude." That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some 
matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, 
that have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a 
lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be 
professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those 
characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, 
breach of trust or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that 
category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when 
considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation. 
[3] A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests 
by words or conduct bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national 
origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, violates 
paragraph (d) when such actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate paragraph 
(d). A trial judge's fintjing that peremptory challenges were exercised on a 
discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of this rule. 
[3a] The Standards of Professionalism and Civility approved by the Utah 
Supreme Court are intended to improve the administration of justice. An 
egregious violation or a pattern of repeated violations of the Standards of 
Professionalism and Civility may support a finding that the lawyer has violated 
paragraph (d). 
[4] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a 
good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(d) 
concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application 
of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law. 
[5] Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond 
those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability 
to fulfill the professional role of lawyers. The same is true of abuse of positions of 
private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, 
director or manager of a corporation or other organization. 
